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NYSE Euronext – Deutsche Börse Merger:  
Let the dance go on! 
Diego Valiante 
he recent wave of consolidation among exchanges 
has shaken the global financial community. For the 
first time since the beginning of the financial crisis, 
the industry has been able to steal the limelight from 
regulators. The situation is heating up at global level, 
galvanising the entire sector. The market is stretching its 
muscles after a long rest, reshaping once again the global 
trading landscape with a list of new potential mergers (see 
Table 1 below). But something different seems to drive 
consolidation this time. Mergers among exchanges have 
been rather frequent since the demutualisation in the 1990s, 
but this time – at least for the biggest merger proposal 
between NYSE Euronext (NE) and Deutsche Börse (DB) –
 they seem to be designed to strengthen exchanges’ market 
power outside equities. As a matter of fact, 'organised' 
trading platforms are day-by-day extending their 
boundaries to a more global scale and into more complex 
asset classes, for which the provision of execution and 
related services is already an important source of revenues. 
Table 1. Merger talks in progress 
Controlling 
company  Target company  Date 
Singapore 
Exchange  Australian Exchange  25 October 
2010 
BATS Global 
Trading  Chi-X Europe  22 December 
2010 
London Stock 
Exchange Group  Toronto Stock Exchange  9 February 
2011 
Deutsche Börse  NYSE Euronext  9 February 
2011 
NASDAQ OMX  InterContinentalExchange  18 February 
2011* 
Tokyo Stock 
Exchange 
Osaka Securities 
Exchange  9 March 2011
* Not officially confirmed by parties (see 
http://www.finextra.com/news/fullstory.aspx?newsitemid=22281). 
 
 
 
Exchanges need now to redesign their business models in 
order to keep pace with changes in market structure. To 
grow and gain business at global level, exchanges are 
currently consolidating businesses to acquire relevant 
know-how and economies of scale in non-equity asset 
classes and to reinforce the vertical (silo) model. For 
instance, well before this latest wave of consolidation, 
Deutsche Börse (through Eurex) and NYSE Euronext (after 
the acquisition of the London International Financial 
Futures Exchange, ‘LIFFE’, in 2001) have been running 
very profitable businesses in well-defined derivatives 
markets niches.  
Hence, the new process of consolidation ought to 
strengthen scale and expand business in non-equity 
financial instruments at global level, taking stock of two 
general developments: 1) the liberalisation process and 2) 
the financial crisis. 
Firstly, the abolition of concentration rules following the 
implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID), as well as the abolition of the order 
protection rule in the US (with RegNMS1), have liberalised 
the provision of execution services by allowing newcomers 
to compete with incumbents under roughly equal 
conditions. As a result, exchanges are striving to source 
enough revenues in order to keep their current cost 
structures. In equity markets, over ¼ of the entire trading 
turnover is currently done on pan-European trading 
platforms, and proposals such as a pan-European listing are 
gradually re-gaining ground. This situation calls for 
diversification and greater scale. 
Secondly, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, a major 
regulatory overhaul is aiming to increase transparency and 
safety for non-equity financial instruments through greater 
use of organised trading platforms. Exchanges, therefore, 
want to be ahead of this process by investing in new 
infrastructures and human resources or using mergers to 
strengthen their role in new business areas, in which they 
can find strong complementarities (see Table 2 below). 
                                                        
1 ‘Regulation National Market System’, Release No. 34-51808, File 
No. S7-10-04. 
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Table 2. Potential synergies 
  Firms  Key business synergy  
SGX/ASX 
Singapore Exchange  International listings, equity futures, OTC derivatives clearing 
Australian Exchange  Listings, stock options, fixed income futures 
BATS/Chi-X 
BATS Global Trading  Access to US markets, listings, IT 
Chi-X Europe  Pan-European trading volumes 
LSE Group/TMX 
LSE Group  Blue chip listings, bond trading, IT 
Toronto Stock Exchange  Listings SMEs, derivatives trading 
DB/NYSE Euronext 
Deutsche Börse  Long-term interest rate derivatives, equity indices derivatives, clearing 
and settlement, access to Asia 
NYSE Euronext  Short-term interest rate derivatives, listings, equity dark trading, 
access to the US 
NASDAQ OMX/ICE 
NASDAQ OMX  Equity trading, listings, access to the EU 
InterContinentalExchange  Clearing, derivatives trading 
Tokyo SE/Osaka SE 
Tokyo Stock Exchange  Equity trading, listings 
Osaka Securities Exchange  Options and futures trading 
Source: Author. 
 
As a consequence of these multiple aspects, exchanges will 
gradually become trading platforms, offering execution and 
related services across asset classes. Stocks, in fact, are 
becoming a small part of their core business activity. For 
instance, the London Stock Exchange has recently revealed 
details of its plan to extend its business to derivatives 
through the creation of a pan-European platform 
(Turquoise derivatives) for single name and index futures 
and options. This announcement comes after the merger 
proposal with TMX, which owns the EDX derivatives 
platform based in Montreal. This platform will most 
probably emerge, together with Chi-X’s new platform, as 
one of the main competitors of NYSE LIFFE and Eurex in 
listed derivatives instruments. Finally, Deutsche Börse has 
recently acquired control of the European Energy 
Exchange in Germany, which marks a further step towards 
diversification. 
The merger case 
The merger proposal between NYSE Euronext and 
Deutsche Börse will create the world’s biggest exchange by 
revenues and total value (see Table 3 below). The result 
will be a group with more than €5 billion as total revenues, 
operating in several countries and with a total value higher 
than €17 billion. DB will spend €7.37 billion ($10.2 
billion) to complete the takeover and merge both firms into 
a new holding company headquartered in the Netherlands.  
Both companies expect cost synergies of €300 million 
through the integration of their equity and derivatives 
businesses for execution and post-trading services. More 
specifically, NE will bring its experience in short-term 
interest rate listed derivatives, listings (NE represents over 
50% of US-EU15 domestic market capitalisation), dark 
equity trading (with Smartpool) and access to US markets,2 
                                                        
2 Eurex has already tried to enter the US market for futures, but in 
while DB will bring in its long-term interest rate listed 
derivatives business, its securitised products through 
Eurex’s platform, and its strong value added services in 
clearing and settlement services (silo model). As indicated 
by the joint press release,3 roughly 37% of total combined 
revenues will come from derivatives trading and clearing, 
while 29% from cash (bond and equity) listings, trading 
and clearing, 20% from settlement and custody, and 14% 
from market data, index and IT services.  
 
Table 3. Key figures (€ million) 
  DB  NYSE – 
Euronext 
Combined 
result 
2009 Total 
revenue  2,061 3,437  5,498 
2009 Net 
income  496 156  652 
2010 Net 
revenue  - -  4,100 
2010 EBITDA* - -  2,100 
Group value  10,945  6,224  - 
Cost synergies  -  -  300 
* EBITDA = Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization. 
Sources: Companies’ joint press release (for 2010 data) and 2009 
annual reports. 
                                                                                                 
2005 it filed an antitrust lawsuit against CME and CBOT alleging 
that the exchanges were impeding its entry in the US futures market. 
3 See http://www.euronext.com/news/press_release/press_release-
1731-FR.html?docid=960708. NYSE Euronext – Deutsche Börse Merger: Let the dance go on! |3 
 
Figure 1. NYSE Euronext and Deutsche Börse revenues (split by businesses)* 
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* For NE 2010 data and for DB estimation from 2009 data. 
Sources: Companies’ public accounts.  
As shown above, both groups currently generate important 
revenue from derivatives markets. This business area has 
constantly grown in the last few years. Even though it earns 
less revenue, DB Group has a higher value than NE due to 
the high profitability of its derivatives and post-trading 
businesses.  
Table 4. Eurex and Clearstream (€ million) 
  Eurex  Clearstream 
2009 Total revenue  804 720.8 
2009 EBIT*  377.8 334.7 
Profitability ratio  47% 46.44% 
* EBIT = Earnings before interest and taxes. 
Source: DB’s 2009 annual report. 
 
More specifically, DB brings to the deal Eurex and 
Clearstream, which are the Group’s ‘cash cows’ with 
profitability ratios (total revenues over EBIT) of 
respectively 47% (Eurex) and 46.44% (Clearstream). Eurex 
is also extending its CCP business to OTC derivatives since 
new regulations are pushing for greater use of central 
clearing services. Clearstream, instead, has over €10 
trillion in assets under custody and represents one of the 
biggest European central security depositary (CSD) and 
custodian banks. 
Competition issues 
Since the merger overcomes at least one of the two 
thresholds set in Arts 1.2 and 1.3 Reg. N. 139/2004 (or EC 
Merger Regulation – ECMR), the concentration will 
probably be considered of ‘Community dimension’. The 
merger, therefore, would need to be notified ex ante to the 
European Commission. Notification would have to occur 
before DB begins the public exchange offer, or the initial 
public offer for NE shareholders to acquire the majority 
control of the whole group. As soon as the notification is 
received, the Commission will need to decide (Art. 6, 
ECMR) whether: 
•  the concentration falls under the scope of the 
ECMR; 
•  the concentration is compatible with the common 
market; and 
•  the concentration creates no Significant Impediment 
to Effective Competition (SIEC or SIC test).  
Once the merger is notified, the Commission will have 25 
working days (Art. 10, ECMR) to reply, but the 
investigation period may be extended if needed, in 
particular if (in line with Art. 8) the Commission imposes 
specific conditions on the implementation of the merger. 
The length of the process rarely goes over 105 days, even if 
there are conditions to be applied to the merger. 
In line with the EU acquis,4 the Commission will perform 
the so-called Significant Impediment to Effective 
Competition test (SIEC or SIC test), i.e. an evaluation test 
based on dominance and potential anticompetitive effects 
of the concentration. This test, on the one hand, looks at the 
combined market share and dominance effect (static 
view),5 but on the other hand it also assesses if the 
competition effects will be transitory or permanent 
(dynamic view).6 As a result of this double-edged test, 
concentrations that would create a temporary dominant 
position may not necessarily create a significant 
                                                        
4 The term acquis refers to the whole body of EU legislation, 
jurisprudence and general principles of law. 
5 As in the Tetra Laval case (sentence was annulled in appeal), Case 
T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR II-4381; or in the case 
of Airtours, Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-
2585. 
6 For instance, it may happen that a merger gives to one market 
player a dominant position, but this position does not impede 
newcomers from entering the market under equal market conditions. 
In this case, there is a chance that the harmful effects of 
concentrating market power on one player will be just temporary, 
while the benefits of the deal (e.g. economies of scale and scope) will 
generate gains for final users.   4 | Diego Valiante 
impediment to competition and thus be approved. It will be 
also important to define the relevant market in order to 
assess potential competition effects. In practice, however, 
the Commission has frequently assessed mergers with a 
static approach, giving a limited role to the ‘efficiency 
defence’, and by reversing the burden of proof (making it 
expensive) where dominance arises from conglomerate 
effects (or portfolio effects),
7 as in the NE-DB deal. 
However, the CFI’s (Court of First Instance) repeal of the 
Commission’s prohibition against GE/Honeywell and the 
2008 guidelines on Art. 82 of the Treaty on abuses of 
dominant position (now Art. 102)
8 have given a clear signal 
that more prominence will be given to the efficiency gains 
brought about by mergers. 
In the merger between NE-DB, there are two main aspects 
the Commission will need to take into account: 1) the joint 
dominant position in listing services and derivatives trading 
and 2) the risk of creating bottlenecks in the post-trading 
business. 
For listing services, after the merger NE-DB will 
eventually hold 63% of domestic market capitalisation of 
the US and EU-15 markets combined. Even though this 
position is clearly dominant, this situation does not 
represent a significant impediment to effective competition 
since listing services do not compete across these markets, 
even though they may compete in the future. Given the 
high entry barriers and the absence of a pan-European 
listing, listing services are still national markets and the 
merger does not concentrate market power and create an 
impediment for newcomers to enter. 
For the derivatives trading business, the situation is more 
complicated. The Commission will need to look into the 
two main asset classes traded on the LIFFE and Eurex 
trading platforms: interest rate derivatives, and equity 
derivatives (single names and indices). Table 5 shows that 
over 98% of listed derivatives on LIFFE and Eurex are 
equity and interest rate derivatives. 
 
Figure 2. Main listed derivatives instruments traded,* 2010 (number of contracts) 
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*Including more than 98.5% of total contracts traded on both platforms. 
Sources: WFE, LIFFE, Eurex. 
7 The merging firm has to demonstrate that efficiency effects offset 
potential anticompetitive effects. See, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, 
Case N. IV/M.938 OJ [1998] L 288/24; and General Electric/ 
Honeywell, Case N. COMP/M. 2220.  
8 See European Commission, Guidance on the Commission's 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, EU COM 
2009/C 45/02.  NYSE Euronext – Deutsche Börse Merger: Let the dance go on! |5 
 
 
For interest rate (IR) derivatives, the merger will create a 
quasi-monopoly in the provision of execution services for 
listed IR derivatives in the EU. As suggested by the table 
below, the two platforms will hold over 97% of the EU 
market and around 50% of the US and EU markets 
altogether. In practice, two big players will hold the entire 
business of IR listed derivatives on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  
 
Table 5. EU and US market shares (listed markets; number of contracts and %) 
  LIFFE  % EU markets  Eurex  % EU markets 
EU market 
IR Options  190,915,098  78.48%  51,564,171  21.20% 
IR Futures  326,744,287  43.03%  414,119,160  54.54% 
LIFFE + Eurex  % EU markets  CME Group  % US markets 
EU and US 
markets 
IR Options  242,479,269  99.68%  223,813,168  99.84% 
IR Futures  414,119,161  97.57%  849,280,491  93.00% 
EU+US 
markets 
IR Options  51.87%  47.88% 
IR Futures  44.30%  50.78% 
Global 
markets 
IR Options  45.96%  42.43% 
IR Futures  21.39%  43.87% 
Sources: WFE, Companies’ websites. 
 
 
However, beyond these bold numbers, there are potential 
defences that may clear this part of the business also from a 
competition policy perspective. Firstly, taking into account 
over-the-counter (OTC) dealers, OTC inter-dealer 
platforms, or other B2B OTC platforms, the ‘relevant 
market’ may be considered big enough to deem the 
concentration harmful. However, this defence would lose 
strength so far as regulatory changes push OTC products 
towards more organised trading platforms. 
As shown by the next table, another relevant defence 
would be the fact that LIFFE and Eurex offer execution 
services in IR derivatives products that are not substitutes. 
In particular, LIFFE mainly offers trading for short-term IR 
derivatives, while Eurex for long-term IR derivatives.  
Table 6. Listed IR derivatives by maturity 
  LIFFE  % EU Markets  Eurex  % EU Markets 
Short Term IR 
Futures 301,886,363  99.87%  403,243  - 
Options 190,137,814  100.00%  n/a  - 
Long Term IR 
Futures 24,857,924  -  413,715,917  94.33% 
Options 818,236  -  51,564,171  98.44% 
Source: WFE, Companies’ websites. 
 
Therefore, these products do not have any immediate 
substitutability and can be considered as complementary 
products in two separate markets. The concentration would 
not thus reduce competition or impede newcomers to offer 
execution services for similar or new IR derivatives 
products. As a result, the potential effects on competition 
would not be harmful. 
The situation is slightly different, however, concerning 
equity derivatives and equity indices derivatives. Eurex and 
LIFFE are direct competitors and together hold a high 
market share in the provision of trading and related 
services. They trade similar instruments and also benefit 
from the close link with underlying stock markets. In 
addition, OTC trading of equity derivatives is a tiny part of 
the OTC derivatives markets. Table 7 below thus shows the 
joint market share that the two platforms would enjoy and 
compare it with the EU and global markets. 
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Table 7. Listed equity and equity index derivatives, 2010 
  Stock options  Single stock futures  Stock index options  Stock index futures 
 
Number of 
contracts 
traded 
% of total 
EU 
Number of
contracts 
traded 
% of total 
EU 
Number of 
contracts 
traded 
% of total 
EU 
Number of 
contracts 
traded 
% of 
total EU 
Eurex  283,339,061 51.29% 150,748,431 31.96%  342,919,472  81.79%  407,772,104 71.19% 
NYSE.Liffe   194,714,042 35.24% 291,272,890 61.74%  57,433,095  13.70%  94,268,808  16.46% 
Total EU  552,460,906  471,747,531  419,283,113  572,788,416 
World   3,631,919,969  786,014,934  5,036,327,425  1,881,722,248 
Sources: WFE, LIFFE, Eurex. 
 
As a result, the merger would increase concentration and 
reduce competition for listed equity derivatives in the EU. 
The dilemma is how the Commission will define the 
relevant market and whether any restrictive conditions for 
the provision of post-trading services will be imposed on 
the merging companies to soften potentially 
anticompetitive effects. If the Commission applies a more 
dynamic approach and considers that the relevant market is 
global, the anticompetitive effects of such a merger may be 
considered negligible, outside stock futures. For stock 
futures, in effect, any efficiency defence may not be well-
grounded as both platforms compete on similar products 
and complementarity is therefore limited. The deal would 
certainly provide strong economies of scale, but if no 
competitors will challenge these volumes, the burden of a 
quasi-monopolistic market share may worsen market 
conditions and increase costs of trading in the longer term. 
However, the potential anti-competitive effects in the post-
trading market architecture may overcome any efficiency 
defence in this area. Extending the vertical business model 
currently adopted by Deutsche Börse in Germany to 
markets where NYSE Euronext is currently offering its 
services and to all derivatives trading in the EU can raise 
material concerns in terms of competition. Both LIFFE and 
Eurex offer clearing services for derivatives trading. Yet a 
fully vertical (including settlement services) and closed 
(denying access to third parties) business model may raise 
serious difficulties for newcomers because it may create a 
‘bottleneck’ situation, which may ultimately foreclose new 
entries in both trading and post-trading. The dominant 
position in the trading business, combined with a vertical 
silo model, generate long-term harmful effects. In more 
practical terms, on the one hand, investors (investment 
firms) would have limited choice of post-trading service 
providers, in line with the principle introduced by Art. 34, 
MiFID.9 On the other hand, potential newcomers in 
derivatives trading will encounter higher barriers to entry 
because incumbents can raise rivals’ costs by limiting the 
access to their post-trading services. Incumbents may also 
indirectly force new competitors to set up their own post-
trading infrastructure since the closed business model does 
not allow new post-trading services providers to develop 
their business relying on investors’ choice (Art. 34, 
MiFID).  
It is also true, however, that other exchanges (such as LSE 
with Turquoise derivatives) will most likely set up their 
own derivatives trading platforms, but entering a new 
business area is typically much more costly than taking 
over a monopolistic position in the market. 
As a consequence, the Commission may require – as a 
necessary condition to approve the deal – the opening-up of 
the entire post-trading business run by Deutsche Börse, 
which still today denies access to newcomers in clearing 
and settlement in Germany. This condition does not 
necessarily mean divesting the crown’s jewels -Eurex CCP 
and Clearstream – but rather forcing incumbent post-
trading infrastructures to give access to newcomers both to 
data feeds and interoperability agreement, which will be 
scrutinised by national authorities (as defined by EMIR). 
Once assured that the vertical closed model will not affect 
the dynamics of competition in the derivatives trading, it 
will be difficult to find long-term anticompetitive effects of 
the NE-DB merger. Beneficial portfolio effects will most 
likely outweigh any harmful effects. This condition would 
not even come as a surprise since Deutsche Börse is 
already facing the threat of action on this front from the 
European Commission through the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation and the need to provide 
interoperability to third parties. 
In conclusion, an additional issue that the Commission will 
have to look at is the break-off fee
10 of €250 million ($346 
million) attached to the merger proposal. Even though the 
fee may appear low in comparison to the value of the two 
companies, this penalty seems high from a competition 
policy standpoint since it may impede competing bids to 
acquire NYSE-Euronext’s control. For instance, the fee that 
should be paid by NYSE Euronext if the deal does not go 
through represents more or less the total net income of 
NASDAQ OMX in 2010 ($395 million), which is one of 
the firms (with InterContinentalExchange) that is interested 
in launching a competing bid over NYSE-Euronext shares. 
Therefore, the fee may seriously raise rivals’ costs of a 
competing bid, creating ‘anticompetitive’ effects. However, 
it is unlikely that the US authorities will challenge this 
clause under the Delaware State laws, and the Commission 
will need to decide on this matter too.  
_________________________________ 
9 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, Directive 2004/39/EC. 
10 A break-off fee is a penalty that is frequently added to merger deals 
to discourage competing bids on the offeree company (in this case, 
NE). In effect, the offeree company (NE) will have to pay to the 
merging company (DB) this penalty if it decides to accept the offer of 
the competing bidder. In any case, the cost is in the end passed on the 
offeror.    NYSE Euronext – Deutsche Börse Merger: Let the dance go on! |7 
 
 
Conclusions 
Whether ‘trading is like dancing’ or not, exchanges started 
to dance two decades ago with their demutualization and 
consolidation. They now keep on dancing following the 
need to diversify and cope with the results of a challenging 
liberalization process started by MiFID. The recent wave of 
mergers comes after two years of an intense financial and 
economic crisis, resulting from cross-border competition, 
escalating first at European level and then at global level, 
especially for non-equity financial instruments such as 
derivatives. The fight to control the global market for listed 
derivatives has begun and, as long as states continue to 
lower economic and fiscal barriers, cross-border 
competition for the provision of execution services will get 
stronger across asset classes. The market will continue its 
consolidation process until it reaches equilibrium, most 
probably with fewer global trading platforms, at least for 
most liquid products. The implications of such a process 
need to be assessed in a broader context, which also sees 
stronger consolidation in post-trading services. 
Surveillance and management of operational risks will be a 
crucial aspect. 
 
The NE-DB deal will probably be a less painful process 
than the NYSE-Euronext merger in terms of combining 
businesses and realising synergies. Even though the merger 
comes as a defensive measure against growing competitive 
pressures, there is space for important cost synergies (but 
probably less than expected). However, besides the need to 
obtain political support and shareholders’ approval (51% 
for NE and 75% for DB), there are a few competition 
issues to be addressed. As suggested, these concerns may 
be solved by tying clear-cut conditions to the approval of 
the merger by the Commission. An unconditional 
prohibition of this deal would fail to recognize that markets 
are undergoing revolutionary changes and it will just be 
matter of time before we will see another important merger 
looming over financial markets.  
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move freely across borders, and burgeoning competition and lower regulatory barriers have spurred far-reaching 
transformations in the way securities are traded.  
 
 
The MiFID Metamorphosis 
ECMI Policy Brief 16, April 2010: In their assessment of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), adopted 
by the EU in April 2004 and implemented at Member State level by the end of 2007, Karel Lannoo and Diego Valiante 
find that the legislation has been remarkably successful in terms of improving market structure and efficiency. In their 
view, the upcoming MiFID review should therefore take a ‘light touch’, clarifying some definitions and extending price 
transparency to related segments of securities markets. 
Regulatory Challenges for the EU Asset Management Industry 
ECMI Policy Brief 15, April 2010: The European asset management industry is feeling squeezed from all sides, as a result 
of growing prudential, product and conduct regulation. A new Directive, UCITS IV, has only just been enacted, and 
already new challenges are emerging in the regulation of hedge and venture capital funds, the review of the regulatory 
regime for depositaries (or financial custodians) and amendments to the MiFID Directive. In addition, a new European 
supervisory framework is in the making, which implies much stricter controls on enforcement. 
Comparing EU and US Responses to the Financial Crisis 
ECMI Policy Brief 14, January 2010:  Since 2003, the EU and the US have conducted a vibrant regulatory dialogue on 
financial regulation, but domestic priorities seem to have taken precedence in response to the financial crisis. This ECMI 
Policy Brief compares the institutional and regulatory changes occurring on both sides of the Atlantic. On the institutional 
side, it compares macro- and micro-prudential reforms. 
Shaping Reforms and Business Models for the OTC Derivatives Market: Quo vadis? 
ECMI Research Report 5, April 2010: Now that the worst of the financial storm is over, regulators are setting new 
strategies to deal with the systemic importance of the €427 trillion ($604 trillion) over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
market. This paper explores the three major sources of disruptive effects in OTC derivatives: liquidity, counterparty risk 
and legal uncertainty. These risks affect the value chain of a typical derivative transaction and weaken the economic and 
legal rationale behind their widespread use. 
About ECMI – European Capital Markets Institute 
ECMI is an independent non-profit organization created to provide a forum in which market participants, policy-makers 
and academics alike can exchange ideas and opinions concerning the efficiency, stability, liquidity, integrity, fairness and 
competitiveness of European capital markets and discuss the latest market trends. 
These exchanges are fuelled by the publications ECMI regularly produces for its members: quarterly newsletters, annual 
reports, a statistical package, regular commentary and research papers, as well as occasional workshops and conferences. 
ECMI also advises European regulators on policy related matters, acts as a focal point for interaction between academic 
research, market sentiment and the policy-making process, and promotes a multidisciplinary and multidimensional 
approach to the subject. 
ECMI is managed and staffed by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. Its membership is composed 
of private firms, regulatory authorities and university institutes. 
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